

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“The desirability of creating organizations of a scope more limited than the
market as a whole is partially determined by the characteristics of the network
of information ﬂows.” Arrow (1974:37).
A crucial task of economic organization is the match of valuable opportunities with talent.
However, because of the decentralized nature of information, no central authority is able to
determine who is best qualiﬁed to deal with a particular problem.1 In fact, often the only
individual who knows that an opportunity exists is the one confronting it.
This paper studies how economic organization assigns opportunities to talent when the
knowledge of the time and place of an opportunity is separate from the substantive knowledge
required to deal with it. It shows the conditions under which a partnership, a set of agents
who agree ex-ante to share the opportunities that may arise and the income from these
opportunities, naturally emerges as a solution to this assignment problem.
The problem we study is of particular relevance to the organization of professional ser-
vices. Consider for example a mediocre personal injury lawyer who receives a potentially
highly proﬁtable client.2 The lawyer realizes that, were she better qualiﬁed, she could obtain
a substantially higher proﬁt from the opportunity. The problem is that she is the only one
who knows this and, absent any trade, she stands to obtain a considerable, but lower, proﬁt
from this client.
Instead, she could refer the client to a better lawyer than herself. The obstacle to this
transfer is that the contract generally cannot be made contingent on the actual quality
of the case, since determining the value of the claim requires meeting the client, with a
high risk that the client is lost to the originating lawyer. As a result, absent reputational
considerations, the market may be prone to adverse selection, as the referring lawyer may
try to refer bad cases as if they were good.
1It was Hayek (1945:519) the ﬁrst who stressed that “the peculiar character of the problem of a rational
economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must
make use never exists in a concentrated or integrated form.”
2We present systematic empirical evidence on contracts in the personal injury referrals market later in
the paper.
1To investigate these issues we write a simple model where clients lack the expertise to
assess the value of their claim. As a consequence, clients cannot sort themselves eﬃciently.
We capture this problem by having opportunities randomly ﬂow to agents. Agents then must
decide between passing on the opportunity or handling it themselves. Team production is
endogenous, as the decision to involve another agent in the production process lies with
the agent who knows about the economic opportunity.3 Before engaging in production the
problem of the client must be diagnosed in order to learn its full value. The information
obtained from the diagnosis is unveriﬁable to outsiders, as it is based on ‘soft’ knowledge.
Allocating optimally the opportunity requires compensating the agent who knows about its
existence in a way that gives her the proper incentives when she is actually best qualiﬁed
to deal with it, while giving her incentives to refer the rest. At the same time, the contract
must avoid moral hazard on the part of the agent receiving the referral, who could always
blame the referring agent for misreporting the value of the opportunity.
When opportunities accrue to high skill agents, referrals ﬂow, if they do, “downstream,”
that is, from more skilled to less skilled agents. In this case referral incentives are perfectly
aligned with eﬃciency, as the high skill agent prefers to keep the valuable tasks and to re-
fer downstream the rest. As a result, simple ﬁxed price contracts implement the ﬁrst best
allocations. Similarly, no incentive conﬂict exists when the matching problem is strictly
‘horizontal,’ that is, whenever agents’ skills are not compatible with each others’ opportu-
nities. In this case the referring agent cannot appropriate the opportunity and ﬁxed price
transactions support the ﬁrst best.
We show that this simple result does not survive when referrals ﬂow “upstream,” that
is, from less to more skilled agents. Now ﬁxed price transactions lead to adverse selection
problems and market breakdowns, as any price that induces a less skilled agent to refer
valuable opportunities leads her also to refer less valuable ones. Sharing contracts may be
used to signal the value of the opportunity. However, since the referring agent can always
choose to keep the problem herself, the necessary distortions in the output of the high skill
3Thus our model combines aspects of a multitasking problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987, 1991) with
those of team production (Holmstrom, 1982). It is multitasking problem because agents have to decide
between referring the opportunity or engaging in production. It is also a team production problem because,
if the referral takes place, one agent will perform the task of referral and another that of production.
2agents are such that the most valuable problems may not be referred. As a result, the spot
market severely under-refers compared to the ﬁrst best.
When the agents can monitor each other’s income even when no joint production is
involved, they can improve on this allocation by establishing an ex-ante referral agreement
or ‘partnership.’4 These contracts commit them to share income from their clients regardless
of who ultimately handles the opportunity. In particular they allow the partnership to “tax”
the agent in possession of the opportunity even when she does not refer it. As a consequence,
these contracts reduce eﬀort incentives on the opportunities that the agent retains but, at the
same time, they also reduce her incentives to hold on to the opportunities ex-post, making
her willing to refer them for a lower share.
Writing such a complete contract requires making income from the clients observable and
veriﬁable, even when the same agent who draws the client deals with the opportunity and
no joint production takes place. In turn, making the revenue ﬂows observable and veriﬁable
requires that the agents jointly bill their clients. This joint-billing feature is likely to lead
the ex-ante referral agreements object of our study to take the form of legal partnerships or
ﬁrms.5
Professional service partnerships are, in this view, joint billing arrangements that allow
agents to create a nexus of ex-ante revenue and opportunity sharing contracts with each
other. Such partnerships should be created by agents when some threat of appropriability of
the value of the opportunities exist, i.e., when the skills of the agents are specialized but to
some extent overlaping, so that agents can extract some rents by withholding opportunities
that should correspond to another agent. No speciﬁc assets or non-contractible investments
(unlike in the Grossman-Hart-Moore setting) need to exist. Agents form partnerships be-
cause specialization requires sharing opportunities. This sharing is facilitated by ex-ante
contracting, as individuals have a smaller incentive to extract information rents by with-
holding opportunities from those who are better suited to take advantage of them. Ex-ante
4The economics literature (e.g. Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988 or Legros and Matthews, 1993) has used
the word partnership to refer to ex-ante income sharing arrangements between agents engaged in team
production. Our usage, which refers to agents who agree to share opportunities and the income from those
opportunities, is more closely aligned with the legal term.
5A priori, it is possible that two agents could agree to bill their clients together through the same
accountant, for example. In our view, this would be, the facto, a partnership.
3contracting requires, in turn, jointly billing the clients of the agents involved in order to
avoid concealment of the existing opportunities.
An additional implication of our model refers to the determinants of eﬀort incentives
faced by the agents in partnerships. In the standard setting, the cost of providing incentives
is that they force the agent to bear some of the risk associated with production, which is
costly because of either risk aversion or limited liability. However the evidence supporting
this traditional view is “tenuous” at best (Prendergast (1999,2000)). In contrast, we suggest
that the cost of providing incentives for eﬀort is that they increase the risk of the agent
missappropriating an opportunity she should refer upstream. In particular, incentives for
eﬀort provision are more powerful the lower the expected need for referrals.
No previous literature has, to our knowledge, studied referrals under asymmetric infor-
mation. Garicano (2000) discusses a hierarchical referral process when agents incentives are
aligned, so that asymmetric information is not a problem. Demski and Sappington (1987),
Wolinsky (1993) and Taylor (1995) deal with the role of expert advisors under asymmetric
information, but all these papers study the relation between the client and the expert, rather
than the incentives of the expert to allocate the problem to someone more qualiﬁed.6 We
assume instead that clients are completely uninformed and arrive randomly to experts, and
focus on the relationship between the diﬀerent experts.
Another branch of the literature deals with the behavior of agents in partnerships. For
Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) partnerships are coalitions that divide output equally. They
study coalition formation games under such constraint, and obtain implications for the size
and composition of such partnerships. Legros and Matthews (1993) study incentives in
deterministic partnerships (teams sharing output) with general sharing rules and show that,
under very general conditions, partners choose the eﬃcient actions. Kandel and Lazaer
(1992) study peer pressure in partnerships, taking the existence of the partnership as given.
None of these papers deals with the problem of the allocation of opportunities among agents,
which this paper considers their fundamental role. Moreover, these papers take the ex-ante
6Demski and Sappington study the problem of inducing an expert to acquire knowledge in situations
when the easiest thing for him is to make a blind recommendation rather than go through the trouble of
actually ﬁguring out what went wrong. Wolinski studies the development of reputation by these experts in
the presence of consumer search. Taylor analyzes the market solutions to the problem posed by the expert’s
incentive to always recommend treatment to an uninformed consumer.
4contract between the parties committing them to share income as given. Unlike in these
papers, partnerships appear endogenously in our set-up. Agents agree to share income and
opportunities, even though they could choose not to share either.
An alternative hypothesis that aims to explain the emergence of professional service
partnerships was ﬁrst enunciated informally by Gilson and Mnookin (1985), who suggest
that law partnerships are a risk pooling arrangement. The aim of this arrangement is to
encourage ex-ante investment by lawyers in specialized areas which have uncertain future
demand. They argue that ﬁrm speciﬁc capital is the glue that binds the ﬁrm together and
prevents those that invested in successful practices from leaving the ﬁrm. We believe this
treatment fails to take into account the substantial income variation that exists inside most
law ﬁrms, as we show in the next section. Moreover, a risk sharing model makes the opposite
prediction of our model for the scope of the partnership. Law ﬁrms should include, in such
a model, as many unrelated areas as possible, in order to ensure the maximum amount
of risk-sharing possible. In fact, and consistently with our predictions, law ﬁrms tend to
include related areas among which ensuring the right referral ﬂow is subject to potentially
large incentive conﬂicts.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents some examples that motivate our
modelling choices. Section III presents a model of upstream vertical referrals, which is inves-
tigated in sections IV and V. Section VI considers downstream and horizontal referrals, and
shows that in this case no asymmetric information problem exists. Section VI also discusses
the implications of the model for the scope of the partnership. Section VII concludes.
II. SOME EXAMPLES
In this section we discuss some of the evidence that motivates our modelling choices.
A. Clients of professional services may be unable to evaluate their problem and
identify the right expert
Given the technical nature of the services that lawyers, consultants, accountants, bankers,
and other professionals provide, consumers are not able to determine the right expert for their
problem. For this reason, these professionals are frequently confronted with opportunities
they are not best suited to solve. Knowledge of the ﬁeld allows them to identify the agent
who is best suited for that opportunity. In this situation they must choose between dealing
5with the opportunity themselves or referring it to an appropriate agent. This referral may
take place either in the market or inside the ﬁrm.
An example of market referrals is the injury claim referral market in the state of New
York, which has been studied by Spurr (1988 and 1990). In this market, a lawyer who knows
of a client with an injury claim may refer him to another lawyer. Both lawyers enter into a
referral agreement which is sanctioned by the New York Bar Association.7 Similarly, as we
shall see below, law ﬁrms (Cotterman (1995)), consulting ﬁrms (Mudrick (1990)), and other
professional service ﬁrms8 have explicit compensation formulas that reward professionals for
giving up opportunities and passing them on to other members of the ﬁrm in exchange for
some share of the overall revenues.
Referrals are also present in the ﬁnancial sector. For instance, a venture capital ﬁrm
with little expertise in internet matters may know of an internet opportunity and need to
refer to another one.9 In the commercial banking sector, the issue is whether customers with
substantial investment assets will be served by trust oﬃcers or the stock brokers employed
by the bank, which oﬀer almost identical products. Banks establish thresholds of investable
7These contracts are at the root of multiple legal disputes. As a result, court verdicts are also an excellent
source of documentation on the nature of these contracts. A recent example of these disputes is Florida Bar
vs. Kevin Carson, (91,550 Florida (1998)), in which the dispute is the result of an agreement whereby ‘the
two lawyers entered into a mutually advantageous referral relationship, whereby [one of the lawyers] Mr.
Vasilaros told [the other lawyer] Mr. Carson that he would pay Mr. Carson 25% of the attorney’s fee for
personal injury cases that he obtained as a result of referrals made by Mr. Carson to him.’ A high proﬁle
dispute is documented in ‘Against O’Quinn: Ex-partner sues lawyer for $250 million’ (Houston Chronicle
Feb 15, 1999). Among the issues at the heart of the dispute, the plaintiﬀ claims that the defendant “took
cases referred by [the defendant’s] associates but did not pay him from these cases as he was supposed to.’
8Referrals also occur among sports and other talent agents. A sport or talent agent may know of a hot
rookie player or actor who would be better oﬀ in the hands of another agent with better contacts, although
the rookie may ignore that. For a some discussion of how sports agents obtain a client list (through eﬀort or
referral) see ‘Most black agents shy away from America’s pastime’ Jerome Solomon, in Houston Chronicle,
June 27, 1999.
9Recently, some internet ﬁrms have been created to improve the matching between venture cap-
italists and ﬁrms by facilitating the referral process, notably Venture Capital Online (vcapital.com).
Guides to seeking Venture Capital routinely recommend those seeking funds to explicitly ask venture
capitalists they contact for a referral to other venture capitalist that may be more suitable (see e.g.
http://www.venturedirectory.com/venturecapital.htm).
6assets that segment their customer base into trust or securities brokerage customers, with
customers above the cut-oﬀ point being assigned to trust.10 However brokers frequently
ﬁnd customers who would belong to trust oﬃcers according to the internally decided cut-
oﬀ point.11 Banks must provide incentives to brokers to refer these customers to the trust
department.
We emphasize that the referral practices in these examples arise because only the referring
agent, and not the client or the professional who receives the client from him, has any
information about the quality of the claim. Clearly the client lacks the expertise to assess
the value of his claim and cannot self refer eﬃciently, whereas the receiving professional does
not have access to the information of the referring expert. This informational asymmetry is
at the root of the contracting problem we discuss next.12
B. Referrals between agents in similar product space and geographic areas take
the form of sharing arrangements; those between agents in clearly diﬀerentiated
markets do not involve sharing
The estimation of the value of an opportunity is often based on soft information. This
inherently complicates its truthful communication. Moreover, and maybe more importantly,
revealing the existence of the opportunity means, in many instances, giving it away. The
10On the referral problem in the banking sector see Kehrer (1998) who reports thresholds, that vary across
banks, between $200,000 and $3,000,000.
11This occurs because, according to Kehrer (1998, page 98), in many banks “the security brokerage sales
force dwarfs the trust sales force.”
12Another important case in which referrals play a large role is among physicians. In this case self-
referral is usually impossible. We do not discuss this case however in the text, as writing explicit referral
contracts on the value of the output (‘fee splitting’) is explicitly forbidden by the AMA, 36 state laws and the
Federal Medicare and Medicaid statute (Rodwin 1995:117-120). Still, referral contracts did exist in the past.
Even though in 1902 the AMA resolved that fee splitting without patient knowledge would be considered
a misconduct, this prohibition was not enforced at the time. In 1912, this organization explicitly made
fee splitting acceptable so long as it was disclosed. However, since the foundation of the American College
of Surgeons (who were the ones paying the kickback) in 1913, a powerful anti-splitting force was created.
Members signed an oath to “shun unwarranted publicity, dishonest money seeking and commercialism” and
“refuse utterly all secret money trades with consultants and practitioners” (Rodwin, 1995:29). Between 1914
and 1953, 22 states passed status making fee splitting illegal (see Rodwin, 1995:23-26). For a brief review
of the history of ﬁnancial conﬂicts in the medical profession, with a particular emphasis on fee splitting see
Rodwin (1992). For a survey of physicians’ ﬁnancial incentives see Magnus (1999).
7market for knowledge of ‘circumstances of time and place’ is in this respect similar to the
market for other types of knowledge in which, as Teece (1996:107) has pointed out, ‘trans-
actions [...] must proceed under conditions of ignorance.’
As a result, contracts referring opportunities cannot be based on the opportunity itself.
We observe empirically two regularities:
B.1. Referral contracts between agents with similar skills and similar geographic markets
take the form of output-sharing arrangements.
Spurr (1988, 1990), studies referrals among personal injury lawyers. He ﬁnds that the
referring and receiving lawyer divide up the income obtained from the claim. The contract
only speciﬁes the output shares corresponding to each lawyer, and does not bind any of
the parties to devote a minimum amount of time or eﬀort to pursuing the claims. Spurr
documents13 the existence of referral contracts involving surprisingly substantial sharing of
the recovery of the claim between the referring lawyer and the one who ends up doing the
work. Furthermore, there is a large cross sectional variation in the referral shares of those
contracts. Table I below, which is taken from Table 4 of Spurr (1988), reports the distribution
of referral shares for the contracts in Spurr’s sample.
Similarly, contracts inside accounting,14 consulting ﬁrms15, and law ﬁrms, where agents
have skills that allow them to compete for the same clients, rely on output sharing to
decentralize the allocation of opportunities.16 These ﬁrms usually reward their partners
according to their performance on many dimensions, one of the most important of which is
what they call business origination.17
13Spurr had access, through an order of the Federal District Court of New York, to the ﬁle retainer and
closing statements. These ﬁles contain information about the terms of contract between both lawyers. In
particular they contain the fees to be earned by each lawyer, the gross recoveries and the share of the recovery
assigned to the (actual) litigation lawyer; whether the lawsuit was ﬁled, settled, went to verdict, and the
verdict itself and the names of the lawyers.
14For a discussion see Mudrick (1997).
15Personal communication from several partners of economics consulting ﬁrms.
16For references and data on law ﬁrm’s compensation schemes see Cotterman (1995) as well as the survey
of Compensation Systems in Private Law Firms by Altman, Weil, and Pensa (2000). Additional evidence
can be found in the survey by The Commercial Lawyer, (June/July 2000 issue). For an insightful discussion
of these topics see also Gilson and Mnookin (1985).
17As emphasized by Wilber (2000) business origination, or “rainmaking,” is the most used criterion in
8This is done using either subjective or objective criteria. Most law ﬁrms which link income
to performance rely on subjective performance evaluation (82% according to Cotterman,
1995:24), making it hard for the outsider to quantify the extent to which ‘origination’ is
rewarded. These ﬁrms usually rely on either peer evaluation or some management committee
to determine the rewards.18
Table I







Share of contracts (%) .71 27.56 10.25 52.6 4.59 .71
Source: Spurr (1988)
Other law and accounting ﬁrms explicitly rely on objective distribution systems that
reward referrals and business origination. The most extended system, known as Hale &
Dorr system,19 distributes ﬁrm income to each partner according to their contribution to
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. This system credit partners for work done (60%), business origination
(30%), and proﬁt credit (10%) (Cotterman 1995). Other systems rely directly on business
compensation decision making, above fees collected. Still, not all ﬁrms rely on performance measures to
compensate partners. Some (the minority, according to Cotterman, 1995:29) rely on the lock-step method,
in which only seniority enters in the calculation of the rewards of the partners. Of the 386 US law ﬁrms
covered in the survey by Altman, Weil and Pensa only 9% indicated use of the lock-step method (for a brief
overview of this survey see Wilber (2000)). Also, according to The Commercial Lawyer, (June/July 2000
issue) of the 20 top law ﬁrms in the US, only four use the pure lock-step method: Cleary, Gotlieb, Steen &
Hamilton, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Davis Polk & Wardwell, and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. The
remaining ones used performance related methods similar to the ones we discuss in the text, that go from
the mild modiﬁed lock-step method of Latham & Watkins (85% lockstep and the rest is performance) to
pure merit based methods. Incentives to share business and provide eﬀort in lock-step law ﬁrms are provided
by the law ﬁrm’s “culture,” according to personal interviews with a Cleary partner. For a brief discussion
of the advantages and disadvantages of each system see Altonji (2000).
18Some of these evaluation systems are a ballot, a secret peer review system, point accumulations, a score
card system with several attributes where points are awarded by managing partners, and direct assignment,
the most subjective of the evaluation systems where the whole compensation is decided by managing partners.
19After the originator of this system Reginald H. Smith managing partner of Hale & Dorr of Boston in
the 1940’s.
9origination, and award a share of the income to the partner who can claim to have brought
the client to the ﬁrm (Mudrick, 1990).
Incentive contracts in the banking sector are also in the form of output shares. In the
context of the example above, brokers receive 10% of the ﬁrst year’s year trust fees for the
referral of a customer (see Kehrer (1998), page 98).
B.2 Referral contracts between agents with entirely diﬀerent skills or geographic markets do
not rely on output-sharing arrangements.
Law and other professional service ﬁrms form referral networks that allow one member
of the network to refer to another clients whose problems fall outside their area of expertise
or jurisdiction. A consulting ﬁrm that advises law ﬁrms has identiﬁed 300 such national
and international law-ﬁrm networks.20 For example, a client may need advice on a merger
with a Brazilian company, or may need to register a trademark in diﬀerent countries.21 In
this case, the law ﬁrm who typically handles the clients legal needs may have no expertise
in these areas and may choose to refer to another law ﬁrm with experience in Brazil or in
international trademark registration.
The referral contracts inside these networks are strikingly diﬀerent than the ones dis-
cussed previously. According to an in-depth report in the New York Times (June 8, 2001),
the contractual structure is very simple. Once a client is referred, each ﬁrm separately
charges for its services. Unlike in the arrangements discussed above, “fees are normally not
shared among the ﬁrms, and law ﬁrms within networks do not charge for referrals.”
C. Professional service ﬁrms care about balancing incentives for referrals and for
eﬀort provision
The professional service ﬁrm’s existence depends to a large extent on the proper and
often delicate equilibrium between incentives for referrals and the provision of eﬀort. Too
low shares to originating partners may lead to underreferrals, or in the parlance of law
ﬁrms, “hoarding of cases;” too high shares may lead to overreferrals and too little eﬀort by
receiving partners. Thus the professional service ﬁrm attempts to solve several incentive
20The consulting ﬁrm is Altman Weil Inc. as represented by principal Charles A. Maddock, quoted in
“Making a Network of Lawyers” by Jonathan D. Glater in The New York Times of June 8, 2001.
21Both of these are actual examples from the previously quoted New York Times article.
10problems simultaneously. It tries to encourage the eﬃcient allocation of clients by properly
crediting rainmaking activities, without severely distorting the incentives of those doing the
work.22
The lack of proper referral incentives may lead to severe conﬂicts within the professional
service ﬁrm. An illustrative example is the fall of Watson, Leavenworth, Kelton & Taggart,
a premier Park Avenue law ﬁrm considered one of the giants of patent and trademark law
(see Weingarten (1981)). The ﬁrm disappeared when “the client-share system encouraged
Watson, Leavenworth, Kelton & Taggart, lawyers to guard their clients aﬃliation against
intrusion by others, creating an atmosphere of competition among partners. Some partners
suspected others of hoarding cases...” The law ﬁrm eventually died when one of its star
rainmakers, decided to leave the law ﬁrm and “would likely take substantial accounts with
him, including the Nestle Co. Inc., one of Watson, Leavenworth, Kelton & Taggart’s biggest
clients.”
Underreferrals are also a concern in the banking example introduced above. As Kehrer
(1998) asserts, “stock brokers are prone to customer hoarding; having found a customer
with signiﬁcant assets to invest the bank’s broker is naturally loathe to give the customer
up [to the trust department].” The issue is in fact key to the internal organization of the
bank: “One response is organizational. Several banks have reorganized their business units
to bring retail investment services and trust under the same uniform reporting structure.”
(Kehrer (1998), page 95).
III. A MODEL OF VERTICAL REFERRALS
We start by discussing the optimal referral rule of a relatively less skilled agent who
obtains clients for whom she is potentially underqualiﬁed. We call this an upstream vertical
referral. We leave for section VI the case where clients ﬂow from the more skilled agent or
when the agents skills are so diﬀerent that no substantial risk that the referring agent may
appropriate an opportunity exists. We call the latter case a horizontal referral.23
22Importantly, the design of a proper compensation for referrals encourages specialization, by providing
insurance to the highly specialized lawyer who own less of the client and relies more on others for referrals.
On this point see Trotter (1997), pages 50-1.
23We use the terms by analogy to the vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation terms in Industrial Orga-
11A. Arrival of opportunities, comparative advantage, and referrals
Consider an uninformed client who walks into the oﬃce of an agent (such as a lawyer)
whose skill dealing with the opportunity v that the client represents is low. We call such
an agent the low skill agent. The opportunity v is of uncertain value, v ∈ {v0,v1}, where v0
is drawn with probability π and v1 with probability 1 − π.24 The agent must ﬁrst diagnose
the opportunity and then apply eﬀort e to realize output. Alternatively, after diagnosis, she
may refer the problem to an agent who is more skilled at dealing with that opportunity, the
high skill agent, who will then apply eﬀort to it. We assume that there is a measure 1 of
each of both low and high skill agents.
Let the skill of the low skill agent be θl = η with η ∈ (0,1) and the skill of the high skill
agent be θh = 1. We further assume that there exists a complementarity between eﬀort, skill
and the value of opportunities, so that the marginal value of eﬀort and talent is higher in
higher value opportunities. Furthermore output is non stochastic and is given by:
yi = θiev.
The eﬀort cost is given by ψ(e) with ψ0 > 0 and ψ00 > 0. Furthermore, ψ000 ≥ 0, an
assumption needed to guarantee that the ex-ante contract we introduce below is a concave
program.25 We assume that agents’ utility is given by
ui (e,v) = Ii (e,v) − ψ(e),
where Ii (e,v) is the income of an agent of type i who draws opportunity v and chooses eﬀort
e.
nization, where horizontal diﬀerentiation refers to characteristics that are diﬀerently preferred by diﬀerent
consumers, such as products placed in a Hotelling (1929) line and vertical diﬀerentiation refers to ‘quality’
diﬀerences among products, where a clear ranking of better and worse products exists, such as in Rosen’s
(1972) hedonic model.
24A previous version of this paper, available from the authors, analyzed the case of a continuum of
opportunities and obtained substantially similar results to the ones presented here. We thank P.A. Chiappori
for suggesting that we focus on the discrete case, which greatly simpliﬁes the exposition of the economics of
the problem.
25ψ000 ≥ 0 is not needed to prove any of the results with the sole exception of proposition 5. This is similar
to the assumptions made by Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) in a diﬀerent but related problem (see proposition
1.1, page 59.)
12There are two situations under which the agent can ﬁnd herself without an opportunity:
A low skill agent who has referred the drawn opportunity to a high skill agent, or a high
skill agent who has not received a referral from the low skill agent. Agents who do not tackle
an opportunity gain a reservation utility which we denote by uh for the high skill agent and
ul for the low skill agent. We are interested in economies where, absent any informational
concerns, comparative advantage leads to specialization. In such situations, the ﬁrst best
prescribes the referral of the high value opportunity, v1, and the non referral of v0, that is
economies for which,
max
e {ηev0 − ψ(e)} + uh > max
e {ev0 − ψ(e)} + ul (1)
max
e {ηev1 − ψ(e)} + uh < max
e {ev1 − ψ(e)} + ul. (2)
We assume then that (1) and (2) hold throughout. (1) says that in the event v0 is drawn,
the outside value upstream, uh, should be protected and the low value opportunity should
be assigned to the low skill agent. In contrast, (2), says that if v1 is drawn then resources
upstream should be engaged in production and the opportunity assigned to the high skill
agent at the expense of her outside value.
We also assume that the low skill agent prefers to tackle the low value opportunity rather
than rejecting it and obtaining ul, that is,
ul ≤ max
e {ηev0 − ψ(e)}. (3)
Assumption (3) also guarantees that the low skill agent prefers to draw tasks rather than just
enjoy her outside opportunity and, as a consequence, opportunities ﬂow into the economy.
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13The role of the referral then is to match a higher value problem with a more skilled agent.
The high skill agent not only adds more value to the problem given her talent, but also works
harder, since the marginal value of her eﬀort is higher.
B. Veriﬁability of opportunities and information structure
The production technology above captures the situation described in the ﬁrst subsection
of section II: an agent receives a client who may (or may not) have to be referred to another
agent. As illustrated in section II.B, however, contracts often cannot be written conditionally
on the value of the opportunity nor on the eﬀort provided by each agent. For the receiving
agent to verify the value of the client would require evaluating the client. But, in this case,
the referring agent agent runs the risk of being bypassed and losing the client. This is
another instance of what Arrow (1971:151) termed the fundamental paradox of information:
‘its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in
eﬀect acquired it without cost.’
Given this limitation on the information available, ﬁxed price contracts cannot motivate
the low skill agent to transfer the best opportunities and keep the worst. The argument is
standard (Akerlof (1970)). Any price that is suﬃcient to encourage a low skill agent to refer
a high value opportunity leads her to the referral of any lower value opportunity as well.
Proposition 1. No ﬁxed price contract exists which result in the low skill agent keeping
the low value problems and passing on the high value problems.
The ineﬃciency caused by the low skill agent referring the wrong opportunity to the
high skill agent produces two related types of eﬀects that we aim to capture in our model.
First, there is the direct eﬀect of the misallocation when high skill workers are matched with
lower value opportunities. Second, there is also the economic loss produced by the waste of
the information obtained from the draw, substituted by the strategic misrepresentation of
the value of this opportunity produced by the referring agent. We capture this eﬀect in our
set-up by assuming that the eﬀort decision of the high skill agent is based on the information
conveyed by the low skill agent.26
26Our assumption that all the information about the value of the problem is provided by the referring agent
may seem extreme. It can be relaxed by assuming that both the referring agent and the agent accepting the
14Output-based contracts assign each agent i a share si[y] of the prescribed output y. Such
contracts must solve two incentive conﬂicts. First, contracts must ensure that low skill agents
with a low value opportunity ﬁnd it in their interest to keep such opportunity, rather than
trying to refer it to the high skill agents (adverse selection problem). Formally, let ul(v0|v0)
be the utility obtained by the low skill agent who draws and truthfully signals v0. Similarly,
let ul(v0|v1) the utility of a low skill agent who having drawn v0 behaves as if v1 had been
drawn, trying to refer it to the high skill agent. Then, the adverse selection’ constraint is:
ul(v0|v0) ≥ ul(v0|v1). (6)
Second, high skill agents may choose to supply too little eﬀort and blame the referral
(a moral hazard problem). Incentive compatibility requires that the agent who receives the
referral have the right incentive to produce the prescribed eﬀort, rather than allocate too
little eﬀort to the opportunity, reduce the output, and claim that the quality of the client
was misreported by the referring agent. Formally, calling uh(v1|v0) the utility of a high skill
agent who claims he received a low value referral, when it was high, and uh(v1|v1) the utility
of a high skill agent who acknowledges the high value problem was received, the ‘moral
hazard’ constraint is:
uh(v1|v1) ≥ uh(v1|v0). (7)
We study how these incentive conﬂicts aﬀect referrals under two diﬀerent institutional
arrangements that are reﬂected in diﬀerent timings of the contract. First, as illustrated in
section II, an agent may engage in trading opportunities in an ad-hoc manner, writing a spot
contract only after observing an opportunity she is not qualiﬁed to handle. Alternatively,
when agents jointly bill clients, they convert the income ﬂow in observable and veriﬁable even
when no communication that an opportunity was generated takes place. As a result, they
can form a partnership, and write a contract ex-ante that commits them to share revenues
and to refer opportunities to each other regardless of who deals with the opportunity.
referral may spend resources diagnosing the problem and observing noisy signals on its value. As long as the
signal of the referring agent has some informational content its communication will bias the eﬀort choice of
the high skill agent, who will combine that signal together with hers to form a posterior on the value of the
opportunity at hand.
15We follow most of the literature on static (one period) asymmetric information problems
in making two assumptions throughout the paper. First, ex-post eﬃciency rules out the
possibility of budget breaking in the productive relationship.27 For this reason the share
of output that the contract awards the high skill agent is sh[y] = y − sl[y]. Second, the
parties can commit to the contracts they sign so that no renegotiation takes place ex-post.28
Moreover, we restrict ourselves to deterministic mechanisms and to organizational forms that
solely combine one low skill agent with a high skill agent.29
Throughout the whole analysis, the decision to contract, and the informational asymme-
tries it involves, is endogenous, and depends on the gains from specialization. The parties
may always choose not to communicate and solve the opportunities in autarchy.
IV. SHARING, SIGNALING, AND REFERRALS IN THE SPOT MARKET
In this case, the two parties determine the terms of the exchange once the referring
party has observed the value of the opportunity at hand and the convenience of referring it.
We start the analysis by studying the speciﬁc form that the relevant incentive compatibility
constraints (inequalities (6) and (7)) take in this case. Then we provide a full characterization
of the signaling equilibrium program and solution, as well as some numerical examples.
A. Incentive compatibility constraints and the spot signaling program
A.1 The adverse selection problem of the low skill agent
We start by studying the adverse selection constraint (6) of the low skill agent. Assume
that the high skill agent accepts a referral by a low skill agent. Let yh(vi|vj) be the output
produced by a high skill agent who believes she has received an opportunity of quality vj
27This is a standard assumption. See e.g. Holmstrom (1982) and Legros and Matthews (1993).
28The assumption of no renegotiation is reasonable in this context. First, the existing institutions, such
as law ﬁrms, have an incentive to enforce contracts to facilitate future referrals. Second, agents have an
incentive to develop a reputation for not renegotiating referral contracts in the hope of maintaining the
credibility of future referral transactions.
29An alternative organizational form would have a low skill agent fully specialized in diagnosis and in
charge of distributing tasks to either another low skill agent or the high skill agent. This would indeed solve
many of the asymmetric information problems here presented but at the potentially high cost of having one
of the agents not producing at all. Thus an upper bound on the distortions we study is the price of an extra
worker.
16when the true quality of the referred opportunity is vi, where vi,vj ∈ {v0,v1}. The contract
awards the low kill agent a share sl[yh(vi|vj)] of the output produced. Constraint (6) requires
that low skill agents whose opportunity is v0 keep it, rather than refer it and pretend it to
be opportunity v1. In the ﬁrst case the low skill agent performs the ﬁrst best level of eﬀort,
whereas in the second case she gets her reservation utility plus the share of the output that










≥ ul + sl[yh(v0|v1)], (8)






ηv0. It remains to determine the output
produced by the high skill agent under a deviation of the low skill agent, yh(v0|v1). The
eﬀort exerted by the high skill agent is as if the low skill agent had referred the high value
task,
yh(v1|v1)












Equation (8) is the incentive compatibility constraint associated with the adverse selec-
tion problem faced by the low skill agent whose draw is v1.
What prevents setting sl[y(v0|v1)] low enough to discourage imitation from low skill
agents with low value opportunities? The answer lies in that our problem is also one of
moral hazard. From the moment the opportunity is referred a new informational problem
is triggered, namely, the inability of the referring party to contract on the eﬀort supplied by
the high skill agent. If no rents are left to the low skill agent who cheats, the high skill agent
may have too large an incentive to reduce output and pretend she was cheated.
A.2 The moral hazard problem of the high skill agent
We study now the moral hazard constraint of the high skill agent (7). Suppose that the
low skill agent does indeed refer the high value opportunity v1. The prescribed eﬀort is
given by
yh(v1|v1)
v1 . As already mentioned, if instead the low skill agent had referred task v0,
the realized output would have been yh(v0|v1). Thus for the high skill agent to conceal the
value of the client, she must make the output look as if the low skill agent had referred
v0 rather than v1 and she had performed the prescribed eﬀort
yh(v1|v1)
v1 . The eﬀort the high




v1, much less than the prescribed eﬀort.30 The incentive compatibility constraint of















where the left hand side of (10) is the utility under no deviation uh(v1|v1) and the right
hand side is the utility obtained by a high skill agent who unilaterally deviates uh(v0|v1) by
pretending the opportunity is low v0 rather than high, v1.










and, hence, unambiguously identiﬁes the high skill agent as the shirker. As Legros and
Matthews (1993) have shown, with unlimited liability these deviations can be prevented by
suﬃciently penalizing the shirker. For this reason, and without any loss of generality, we
ignore output levels outside Y throughout. Notice that the low skill agent may be deviating
too, but she can only deviate by sending v0.
Finally the contract has to be such that if a referral takes place the high skill agent








We are now ready to write the program that determines the spot contract. A low skill
agent who draws an opportunity v1 faces the choice between referring the opportunity or
keeping it and tackling it himself. Referring it requires oﬀering an incentive compatible
contract to the high skill agent such that the high skill agent agrees to receive it in exchange
for an output share. On the other hand keeping it implies operating in autarchy, in which
case no incentive compatibility constraint is of concern. The problem of the low skill agent
whose draw is v1 is then:



























































sl[y] + sh[y] = y for y ∈ Y (15)
where we have substituted yh(v0|v1) by it’s value as given by equation (9).
Program Pm then selects the output yh(v1|v1) and, indirectly yh(v0|v1), and the share
function sl[·] subject to the incentive compatibility constraints. Next we show that this
program can be considerably simpliﬁed to yield a more tractable one.
First notice that because the measure of low skill agents with the high value task is 1−π
and there is a unit measure of high skill agents, competition among the latter lowers the
utility they receive under the signaling contract to their outside value uh, that is, expression
(14) is met with equality and, as a consequence






















We have reduced the constraints of program Pm to (12), (17), and (15). Clearly any incentive
compatible allocation can be supported with an out of equilibrium share sh [yh(v0|v1)] such







































− (uh − ul), (19)
where we have substituted yh(v0|v1) by it’s value as given by equation (9).


































≥ Θh [yh(v1|v1)], (20)
where













− (uh − ul). (21)
The function Θh [yh(v1|v1)] is the net surplus that the high skill agent generates and the low
skill agent appropriates when the latter refers the low value opportunity v0 and the former
applies eﬀort as if the high value opportunity v1 were the one referred. Constraint (20)
simply says that the utility that the low skill agent obtains when he keeps v0 is higher than
the net surplus he could appropriate from the high skill agent when he refers it.
Finally, we introduce a piece of notation that will be useful below. Let W
m
be the welfare
level associated with the market allocation. Recall that the market leaves the high skill agent
with an utility equal to uh. The utility of the low skill agent depends on whether v0 or v1 is
drawn and whether the latter is referred or not. That is:
W
m



















l(v1) is the equilibrium utility of the low skill agent under the referral and unr
l (v1) is
the equilibrium utility of the low skill agent if the referral of v1 does not take place.
B. Characterization of the spot signaling contract
Let ym
0 and ym
1 the output associated with tasks v0 and v1 respectively under the signaling
equilibrium. As it can be seen in program P0
m, description of the signaling equilibrium is
fully achieved by reporting the output associated with each of the opportunities, [ym
0 ,ym
1 ].
20Proposition 2. The signaling equilibrium is of one of two types.















































The need for truthful communication may involve distortions away from the ﬁrst best.
The key to this distortion is that it is not possible to simply reduce the utility of the low
skill agent who refers v0 by giving her a low share of output without distorting total output
produced. Such arrangement would make it too attractive for the high skill agent to claim
that she was misled. Only a reduction of the output of the high skill agent below what
is optimal makes it suﬃciently unattractive for the low skill worker to refer a low quality
client without making it attractive for the high skill agent to claim that the referring agent
is cheating.
Proposition 2 also shows that there are two possible signaling equilibria with distortions
but they are Pareto ranked. Intuitively, a high quality opportunity may be signaled both by
distorting eﬀort by the high skill agent upwards or downwards. Distorting it downwards is
preferred, since it achieves the same separation at lower cost. For this reason we concentrate
in the signaling equilibrium sa, which we henceforth denote [ym
0 ,ym
1 ]. As the next proposition
shows the distortion is severe enough as to completely destroy the complementarity between
eﬀort and the quality of the task. That is, if the ﬁrst best cannot be implemented, the higher
the quality of the task referred, the lower the eﬀort of the high skill agent.
Proposition 3. Assume that the ﬁrst best cannot be implemented under the signaling
contract. Then the eﬀort exerted by the high skill agent on the task referred is a
decreasing function of the quality of the task.
In summary all eﬀort distortions occur in the set of referred opportunities, which are
the ones subject to the signaling costs. Low skill agents maximize utility by their choice
21of eﬀort on the opportunities they keep, but this eﬀort will only be optimal if the oppor-
tunity is v0. If the opportunity is v1 then the eﬀort supplied by the low skill agent is
e e = argmax{eηv − ψ(e)}, which is clearly less than e
fb
1 . As a consequence optimal eﬀort
provision occurs where it is the least valuable, namely, in the opportunities that the ﬁrst
best assigns to the low skill agents. In contrast high skill agents perform suboptimal eﬀort
gearing output away from ﬁrst best. The next result then follows immediately.
Corollary 4. (Under-referrals) The referral set supported by the spot market is contained
in the ﬁrst best referral set.
The corollary implies that when opportunities are not veriﬁable, the spot markets equi-
librium is associated with underreferrals. Moreover, as the next example illustrates, the
distortion in the eﬀort of the high skill agent may be such that the low skill agent keeps not
only the low value opportunities but also the most valuable ones.
We illustrate these results below with an example of the characterization of the spot
market equilibrium. Before moving on to that, it is important to note that the analysis
made remains unchanged if, in order to account for possible bounded rationality of the
agents, we restrict our attention to linear sharing rules which do not depend on whether
the output is the equilibrium output or out of equilibrium. In the appendix we show that a
separating signaling equilibrium can also be obtained when we restrict the contracting space
to linear shares whose level is independent of the output realized. Of course, eﬃciency losses
are higher in that case.
Example. Assume that ψ(e) = e2
2 . Also assume that v0 = 1.4, uh = 2 and ul = .85. Figure
I reports the possible allocations in the space (η,v1). The curve ˆ vfb (η,uh,ul) denotes the
ﬁrst best referral set: it is the frontier of high value opportunities that should be referred
to the high skill agent, that is, it is the set of v1’s that, given our parametric choices, meet
assumption (2). The purpose of this example is to compare the referral set supported by the
sharing contracts with the ﬁrst best referral set.
There are three possible regions, a, b, and c. Referrals can only be supported in regions
a and b, though in region b the ﬁrst best cannot be implemented. Finally in region c the
signaling equilibrium does not support any referrals.
22In region a the ﬁrst best can be implemented because the net surplus that the low skill
agent could appropriate by misleading the high skill agent about the value of the opportunity










as seen in constraint (20).
Holding η ≤ .23 constant, and as v1 increases, the incentives for the low skill agent to
mislead the high skill agent about the value of the opportunity, as given by Θ[yh(v1|v1)],
increase as well. In region b that incentive is strong enough that obtaining truth telling
requires distorting the output downwards. In region c the downward distortion of output is
large enough as to discourage the referral completely. Recall that, as we show in proposition
3, eﬀort is decreasing in v1 in region b as the distortions are strong enough to undo the
complementarity.
In contrast when η ∈ (.23,.635) only intermediate quality problems are referred. The
reason is that for v1 suﬃciently close to ˆ vfb(η,uh,ul) the distortions are high enough as to
discourage the referral, as now the low skill agent is endowed with a higher skill. As v1
increases the referral once again becomes attractive until the eﬀort of the high skill agent
becomes so distorted as to prevent the referral once again.
Finally when η ≥ .635 distortions required to sustain communication have completely
erased the comparative advantage of the high skill agent.
A striking feature of this outcome is that referrals can never supported precisely when
they are most valuable, that is, when v1 is very high relative to v0. Moreover when referrals
do occur, eﬀort is lower when is also most valuable. The ability of the low skill agent to retain
opportunities dramatically reduces the eﬀectiveness of communication in spot markets. 
FIGURE I HERE
V. JOINT BILLING AND THE VALUE OF PARTNERSHIPS
As documented in our description of professional service ﬁrms in section II, joint billing
allows agents to agree to refer opportunities to each other before they are actually realized,
and to share their income regardless of who deals with them. We refer to such ex-ante
contracts as partnerships. The economics literature has used this term to denote teams of
agents sharing the revenue of a joint activity to which they all contribute. Our use, which is
23more closely aligned to the legal term, refers to agents who share revenues and opportunities
even when not all of them are eventually involved in production.
A. The partnership contract
In order to stress the similarities and diﬀerences with the previous case we ﬁrst derive
the corresponding incentive compatibility constraints and then we write the program that
determines whether partnership arises or not in equilibrium.









≥ ul + sl[yh(v0|v1)], (25)
where yh(v0|v1) is given by equation (9).31
It is worth emphasizing the diﬀerence between equation (25) and the corresponding
incentive compatibility constraint in the spot market transaction (8). In the latter, the
eﬀort exerted by the low skill agent was always ﬁrst best as he fully kept ownership rights
over the opportunity drawn. In contrast, in the present situation the low skill agent pledges
the draw, irrespective of it’s quality, and the resulting output to the partnership. As we
shall see, it may be in the best interest of the partnership to bias the eﬀort applied by the
low skill agent to the resolution of opportunity v0 away from ﬁrst best.
The contract must also ensure that the low skill agent prefers to refer a valuable opportu-
nity v1 rather than keeping it and pretend instead that v0 was drawn.32 Assume then that v1
was drawn. The low skill agent may deviate by announcing v0 and keeping the opportunity
for himself. Clearly the resulting output must be consistent with this announcement and
this can only be achieved if the eﬀort supplied is
yl(v0|v0)
ηv1 . To prevent such possible deviations
the partnership must meet the following incentive compatibility constraint.






31To avoid introducing additional notation we use the same symbol sl[·] and sl[·] as in the previous section
to denote the shares of output that the partnership awards the low and high skill agent respectively.
32Note that in the spot market case this was decided by the low skill agent, who was the residual claimant
to the gains from a good allocation. This constraint is, as a consequence met by the signaling equilibrium
contract when referrals exist as we show below.
24Equation (26) should be compared with the rule that determines whether the referral
takes place or not in the spot market case:









The comparison between equations (26) and (27) holds the key to much of what follows. In
the case of spot market transactions the alternative use of the valuable task is for the low
skill agent to keep it, as seen in the right hand side of equation (27). In contrast, in the
partnership the low skill agent does not have such a choice as the output has to be consistent
with the announcement of opportunity v0.
A judicious choice of yl(v0|v0) can relax the distortions on the valuable eﬀort of the high
skill agent that truthful communication entails. That is, it is by distorting yl(v0|v0) away
from the ﬁrst best, y
fb
0 , that one obtains a value of yh(v1|v1) closer to y
fb
1 . Clearly there are
limits to the distortions on yl(v0|v0) as this output is also valuable and the pursuit of eﬃcient
communication does not come at the expense of fully destroying incentives for eﬀort in the
least valuable tasks.
Finally, and as in the case of the spot market contract, constraint (7) must hold, i.e.
incentives have to be provided to the high skill agent in order to elicit eﬀort from him on















We state next the contracting problem of the agents. The agents can always choose to
forego the beneﬁts of the partnership and take their opportunities, if necessary, to the spot









































































sl[y] + sh[y] = y for y ∈ Y (33)
As in the spot market equilibrium, the contract will set sh[y] suﬃciently low for those
outputs that unambiguously identify the high skill agent as the one deviating from the
prescribed action.
Consistently with the discussion in the introduction and section 3.2, the agents face no
ex-post participation constraints in Pp. There exists no limited liability or risk aversion on
the agents side, nor any constraint on their ability to commit, so if the contract produces
more utility than the spot market, they will enter into it. It is only the need to communicate
truthfully the opportunities what leads to the distortions in the eﬀort decisions of both
agents.
Program Pp can be considerably simpliﬁed by proceeding as follows. First notice that
if (30) is met with strict inequality then sl[yh(v0|v1)] can be raised until (30) is met with
equality, which does not modify the incentives of the low skill agent and can only improve
those of the high skill agent (see equation (32)). A similar argument holds for equation (31).
If it is met with strict inequality sl[yh(v0|v0)] can be raised without distorting incentives.
For this reason,
sl[yh(v1|v1)] = sl[yh(v0|v1)] + Φl (yl(v0|v0)), (34)
and where











26Φl [yl(v0|v0)] is the surplus foregone by the low skill agent when referring v1 rather than
keeping it and saving on eﬀort to produce the prescribed output yl(v0|v0).
Plugging (34) in (32) yields
Φh [yh(v1|v1)] ≥ Φl [yh(v0|v0)], (36)
where


















Φh [yh(v1|v1)] is the surplus generated by the partnership when the high skill agent takes
the prescribed action rather than the possible deviation. Incentive compatibility then re-
quires that the allocation [yh(v1|v1),yl(v0|v0)] is such that enough surplus is generated by the
high skill agent to compensate the low skill agent for the surplus the latter foregoes when
referring v1.













Φh [yh(v1|v1)] ≥ Φl [yh(v0|v0)]
B. Characterization of the partnership contract
Some of the intuition of what follows can be gauged by looking at the constraint (36).
Assume, for instance, that Φh[y
fb
1 ] < Φl[y
fb
0 ]. In this case the agents face the choice of
distorting away from the ﬁrst best either yh(v1|v1), yl(v0|v0), or both. The main diﬀerence
with respect to the spot market case lies precisely in the possibility of worsening the incentives
for eﬀort in v0 away from ﬁrst best to relax the incentive compatibility constraint faced by
the partnership. This possibility did not exist in the spot case because the market lacks the
mechanism to enforce distortions on those activities that do not make it to the market in the
ﬁrst place. The introduction of joint billing achieves precisely this, namely, it allows agents
to distort eﬀort on activities that do not trigger team production to improve incentives for
27communication. This in turn translates into better upstream incentives, where they are more
valuable.
Clearly, output produced with opportunity v0 is still valuable and the partnership weighs
the gains from eﬃcient communication and the improvements in upstream incentives against
the incentives losses downstream. Notice that, in principle, the partnership can implement
the ﬁrst best communication rule by simply paying the low skill agent a ﬁxed wage but in
this case it can elicit no eﬀort from her. The provision of incentives for eﬀort interferes with
optimal communication and for this reason, and as the next proposition shows, distortions
may occur across all tasks, v0 and v1.




1], is one of two types:
























To reiterate, eﬀort exerted in v0 is distorted away from it’s ﬁrst best level in order to
improve incentives for communication. Clearly then the extent of the distortion depends
on the frequency of communication that the ﬁrst best prescribes, as summarized by the
probability 1 − π. As π increases communication becomes relatively less important than
the preservation of the eﬀort incentives on the tasks that are more frequent, v0. The next
proposition establishes the formal link between communication about economic opportunities





1) is an increasing (decreasing) function of π.
C. Comparison with the spot market equilibrium
As shown in proposition 5, distortions away from ﬁrst best may occur even in those
opportunities that do not need to be communicated. Still the partnership does at least as
well as the spot market.
Proposition 7. Any signaling equilibrium is a feasible allocation of the partnership.
The next corollary is then straightforward and is given without proof.
28Corollary 8. (a) The partnership allocation Pareto dominates (weakly) the market allo-
cation and
(b) The referral set supported by the signaling equilibrium is contained in the one
supported by the partnership.
In the spot market signaling equilibrium the ineﬃciency sprang from the large reduction
in high skill eﬀort incentives that the optimal contracts entailed. As we proved here the
ex-ante agreement taxes the low skill agent if she keeps the economic opportunity drawn in
the ﬁrst round. The low skill agent shares the proceeds of her eﬀort with the high skill agent
even when the latter is not involved in production. Clearly, this would never be an outcome
of a spot market. It would involve a worker voluntarily, and in exchange of nothing, sending
a share of the income he obtains to some skilled agent.
As a consequence of this tax, the low skill agent is willing to refer opportunities for
a lower share and this improves the eﬀort incentives of the high skill agent and enlarges
the referral set. Recall though that in the spot market equilibrium the low skill agent is
always performing ﬁrst best eﬀort in the opportunities he tackles. Instead, the partnership
agreement may demand from all agents that they provide suboptimal eﬀort. Still, the
partnership improves on the market allocation because it trades oﬀ better eﬀort incentives
where these are most valuable for worse eﬀort incentives where these are least valuable,
namely on those tasks attempted by low skill agents.
This “re-allocation” of ineﬃciencies from one type of economic opportunities to the other
is unique to the partnerships. By jointly billing the economic opportunities, they allow
agents to commit to the contract and break the fundamental constraint of spot market
transactions: that goods and services simultaneously ﬂow in opposite direction to the spot
price of those goods and services. It is precisely because the partnership distorts incentives
in those opportunities that do not make use of all the resources of the organization that it
can do better than the spot market.
We conclude this section by showing a simple example that compares the allocation
associated with spot market transactions versus that of the partnership.





























that is, if v1 is suﬃciently close to v0 the ex-ante contract cannot implement the ﬁrst best.
As shown in ﬁgure II this occurs both in regions d and e. In region d the distortions are
severe enough as to preclude communication completely, whereas in region e the partnership
arises in equilibrium, but it cannot support the ﬁrst best in equilibrium. When the distance
between v0 and v1 is large enough the partnership arises to implement the ﬁrst best.
The contrast with the referral set supported by the sharing contracts studied in the
previous section is sharp (see ﬁgure I.) The partnership can implement the ﬁrst best for v1s
that are high enough, where this is most valuable, whereas sharing contracts cannot even
support their referrals. 
FIGURE II HERE
In summary both spot markets and partnerships can support the right ﬂow of opportu-
nities into the market but they do so at the expense of distortions in the eﬀort provided by
the agents involved in production. As we show in what follows, these distortions spring from
the control exerted by the low skill agent on the information ﬂow. When information ﬂows
downstream or horizontally there are no distortions associated with referrals.
VI. DOWNSTREAM REFERRALS, HORIZONTAL REFERRALS AND THE
SCOPE OF THE PARTNERSHIP
The paper up to now has studied the case in which a less skilled agent observes an
opportunity and must decide whether to refer it or not. In this section, we analyze two other
cases, in both of which the informational asymmetry exists, but does not result in an incentive
conﬂict. First, we study downstream referrals which are those in which a more skilled agent
30has diagnosed and observed the value of the opportunity and must decide whether to refer it
or not to a less skilled agent. Second, we study horizontal referrals, in which agents cannot
threaten to withhold an opportunity that belongs to another agent and extract some value,
as the skills of the agents are incompatible with each other’s opportunities. In both cases,
the same result holds: no rent-sharing contracts are required to ensure the ‘right’ referral
ﬂow.
A. Downstream referrals
Consider now the case in which an agent draws an opportunity for which he is overqual-
iﬁed. In this case, a referral market with no output sharing can achieve the ﬁrst best
allocation. Simply put, the higher skill agent prefers to refer the less valuable opportunities;
thus a transfer of these opportunities downstream is incentive compatible from her perspec-
tive. Since this is the ﬁrst best allocation, we can decentralize it even under informational
asymmetries.
Proposition 9. If the opportunities ﬂow from higher to lower skill agents, a ﬁxed price
contract supports the ﬁrst best allocation.
B. Horizontal referrals
Consider the following minor variation of the vertical referrals model introduced in section
III. As before one of the agents, say agent A, randomly draws opportunities that now come
in two diﬀerent “specialties” A and B, that is, v ∈ {vA,vB}. The production function is
now,
yi = θi(v)ev for i ∈ {A,B},
where θi(v) = 1 if v = vi and θi(v) = 0 if v 6= vi. Agent A can only tackle opportunities in
ﬁeld A whereas agent B can only do so in ﬁeld B. Furthermore, and it order to guarantee
trade assume that33
0 < ui < max
e {θi(vi)evi − ψ(e)}. (38)
Trivially then the ﬁrst best prescribes matching agents of specialty i with vi for i ∈ {A,B}.
Even if the quality of the opportunity is not publicly observed there is no room for adverse
33The assumption that ui > 0 is made in order to avoid the unreasonable case where an agent may retain
an opportunity of a diﬀerent specialty to avoid the outside value.
31selection problems to occur as it never pays to retain an opportunity of an specialty other
than that of the agent in possession of the opportunity. As in the case of downstream
referrals, ﬁxed price transactions support the ﬁrst best.34
Proposition 10. The ﬁrst best horizontal referral ﬂow can be supported by a ﬁxed price
contract.
C. Scope of the partnership: Discussion
Propositions 9 and 10 hold the last empirical implication of our model. The contractual
structure is determined by the interaction between the relative skill of the agents and the
control of the informational ﬂow. If opportunities ﬂow from less skilled to more skilled
workers, giving a stake to less skilled workers in the correct communication is necessary in
order to obtain the right allocation. As a result, partnerships contracts should be signed
between agents who share some skills, and among whom this threat of appropriation binds.
On the other hand, when opportunities ﬂow from more skilled to less skilled workers, or
when opportunities ﬂow between agents whose skills have no overlap in the sense that they
could not choose to appropriate each other’s opportunities, there is no need for an ex-ante
referral arrangement. Empirically, this implies that agents who are always less qualiﬁed
than any other agent should not receive revenue sharing. Moreover, and consistently with
our discussion in section II.B, referrals between ﬁrms with diﬀerent geographical or product
scope should not involve sharing contracts.
In this sense, referrals between ﬁrms should take place. Professional services ﬁrms are, as
in our model, based on ex-ante agreements to share the income derived from the opportunities
obtained by each member. However, they do not require all opportunities to be referred in
house. Law ﬁrms, for example, specialize in certain areas of the law and not in others. “Wall
Street” law ﬁrms like Cravath or Cleary oﬀer their clients legal advice on those areas that
are the domain of the client’s activities (securities law, mergers and acquisitions, commercial
bank laws, etc,) but not in others (like maritime law.) If a client happens to have a problem
in such a domain, they are referred to another ﬁrm that specializes in that ﬁeld.35
34In particular, and as shown in the proof of proposition 10, zero price transactions support the ﬁrst best
allocation.
35A Cleary partner we were fortunate to interview claimed that the two most important reasons for the
32This outcome is as predicted with our model. Agents should create ex-ante referral
arrangements or partnerships when their skills overlap, so that a substantial threat of ap-
propriability of the opportunity and the resulting misallocation exists. On the other hand,
agents need not create a partnership when the opportunities belong to entirely diﬀerent skill
spaces (such as family law and corporate law) or entirely diﬀerent geographical areas. Agents
should team up in partnerships with those agents to whom they are likely to need to refer
opportunities, but with whom the skills overlap suﬃciently that the risk of misallocation is
large.
Thus our theory generates a theory of the size and boundaries of the ﬁrm that supports
transactions both inside the ﬁrm and in the market. The empirical implications about the
types of practices that ﬁrms should include are very diﬀerent from the implications of risk
sharing theories, such as Gilson and Mnookin (1985). Rather than aiming to diversify the
types of skills they include, partherships should aim to cover all areas which are suﬃciently
related that referrals are likely to be necessary, and where the threat that each agent can
make of appropriating an opportunity is also high.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The purpose of our analysis has been to study how economic organization assigns oppor-
tunities to those who are most qualiﬁed to deal with them in the presence of informational
asymmetries about their value. When agents enjoy an informational advantage due to their
knowledge of an opportunity they may be in fact not qualiﬁed to deal with, economic orga-
nization must provide them with incentives to both refer those opportunities they are not
best qualiﬁed to deal with and to apply eﬀort to those opportunities they keep. Moreover,
incentives must be provided to those who receive the referral to work adequately on it.
We have obtained six main implications of our analysis. First, upstream referrals of
opportunities are subject to adverse selection and, as a consequence, require that the referring
agent take a stake in the output produced by the agent who receives the referral.
Second, truthful communication in the spot market comes at the expense of the com-
parative advantage of high skill agents. Lower (rather than higher) eﬀort is applied the
referral to another law ﬁrm where the lack of expertise in a rare problem a client may have and conﬂicts of
interest (when the same law ﬁrm represents two clients who have a pending suit or conﬂict.)
33higher the value of the opportunity. For this reason communication is severely limited in
spot market transactions.
Third, partnership contracts, in which agents commit to sharing the output of the op-
portunity even when it does not get transferred between agents, improve on the allocation of
spot markets. The reason is that, by taxing a low skill agent who keeps an opportunity, they
decrease her incentive to under-refer. The contracts trade-oﬀ the distortions they impose
on both agents depending on the frequency with which opportunities must be referred. The
higher the frequency of communication, the lower the output of the low skill agent and the
higher the output of the high skill agent. Writing such complete contracts requires making
the revenue from the opportunities observable and veriﬁable, regardless of who deals with
it. This is the critical role played by joint billing of the clients by the partnership.
Fourth, the strength of the eﬀort incentives is limited by the risk that the referring agent
will prefer to appropriate the opportunity if given incentives which are too high powered.
As a result, eﬀort incentives are stronger the lower the ex-ante likelihood that a referral will
be required to take place.
Fith, downstream and horizontal referrals do not require sharing of income between
workers, as they are not subject to adverse selection, and, as a consequence, the ﬁrst best
obtains. Thus it is the relationship between the relative skill of the agents and the direction
of the informational ﬂow what determines the type of contracts observed.
Finally, these ﬁndings have implications for the scope of the partnership. In particular, we
show that partnership contracts should appear between agents who are somewhat specialized,
so that they have comparative advantages in diﬀerent types of opportunities, but share the
same skills to some extent. The reason is that it is among these agents that the threat
of appropriation of the opportunities is more important. Partnerships arise to prevent the
ineﬃciencies in the allocation that otherwise would occur.
There are a number of possible extensions of our analysis. First, we have assumed that
the referring agent can either always appropriate the entire value of the opportunity she
draws, so that her outside value is the value she could extract from the opportunity on her
own; or, alternatively, the agent can, through joint billing, commit completely to share the
income from the opportunity. Many relevant cases may however fall in between, where ﬁrms
face severe diﬃculties in enforcing ex-ante agreements. For instance, partners in a law ﬁrm
34may break up from the ﬁrm and take several of the assets, like clients and associates, with
them. In this case a more general choice for the outside value of the low skill agent may
be given by: y = δηev.36 We can interpret 1 − δ as the productivity gain that results from
the usage of the speciﬁc complementary assets of the long term organization. If the value
of the opportunity is highly complementary to the ﬁrm’s assets, the outside value is 0. The
partnership knows that developing speciﬁc assets that tie employees to the ﬁrm, will improve
the incentives for communication, as access to the speciﬁc assets of the ﬁrm reduces the value
of defecting with an opportunity.37 We leave for future research the in-depth study of these
situations.
Future research also needs to study the implications of endogenizing the referral ﬂow. An
important implication of our set-up is the determination of the contract by the interaction be-
tween the relative skill of the agents and the direction of the ﬂow of information. Intuitively,
if the agents can design information ﬂows, they will trade oﬀ informational asymmetries
against information processing and specialization costs.
Also, in order to focus on the important informational asymmetries between agents, our
model has ignored the role that the client may play in the referral process. Integrating the
analysis of the relationship between the client and the ﬁrst problem solving agent with the
relationship between the two agents is an important issue for future work.
Finally, we have assumed that agents are risk neutral and have unlimited liability. Still,
exogenous limits on the ability of the parties to execute transfers, either ex-ante or ex-
post, also create distortions in eﬀort provision. Future research may dispense with these
assumptions. We believe, however, that in permitting agents to embark in all contracts that
increase joint surplus our analysis has allowed us to focus on the trade-oﬀ between eﬀort
incentives and communication incentives. It is this trade-oﬀ rather than the ‘tenuous trade-
oﬀ’ between risk and incentives (Prendergast (1999)) that plays in our view the key role in
the contractual design of these professional service ﬁrms.
36Situations were the reservation utility is type dependent have been investigated by Lewis and Sappington
(1989) and characterized more generally by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) and Jullien (2000)
37Such an investment possibility by ﬁrms was ﬁrst recognized by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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38APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume the price qas supports the referral of v1 and the non referral of
v0. Then it must be that
max
e
{ηev0 − ψ(e)} > ul + qas > max
e
{ηev1 − ψ(e)}.
But gl(v) = maxe {ηev − ψ(e)} is increasing in v, a contradiction. 
Signaling contracts
With a slight abuse of notation deﬁne the following function:








∆u = uh − ul. (40)


























With some abuse of notation, let Ur
l (y) the utility of the low skill agent if the referral of v1
takes place as a function of y, that is
Ur







l (y) is a concave function with a maximum at y
fb
1 .
We establish in the next lemma some properties of these functions that prove useful below. The
proof of these results is straightforward and is omitted.






























39Proof of Lemma A1. (a) It follows from ψ00(·) > 0 and the deﬁnition of y
fb
1 .



























where the strict inequality follows because y ≤ y
fb
1 and δ ≤ 1. Because Ur
l (y) = Θ(y,1)































v0 and δ ≥ v0
v1. Because Ur
l (y) = Θ(y,1) the result follows. 





Assume ﬁrst that task v1 is indeed referred. The low skill agent can extract all the surplus from
the transaction and hence, if the ﬁrst best can be implemented, he will indeed oﬀer a contract to
support it and that leaves him with all the rents.
Assume next that the ﬁrst best cannot be implemented. Notice that Θ(0, v0
v1) = Ur
















1 ), that is, both function attain the same value at their






































twice and only twice, at y = yma
1 and y = y
mb















h and the signaling equilibrium sa is associated with the underprovision
of eﬀort and sb is associated with the overprovision of eﬀort.
To show that the signaling equilibrium sa Pareto dominates sb, notice ﬁrst that the high skill
agent enjoys utility uh in either equilibrium. Hence the only consideration is whether the low skill






1 it follows from (43) and (44) that
Ur
l (yma



















and sa Pareto dominates sb.
40Finally if the distortions are severe enough as to prevent the referral altogether then the out pro-
duced by the low skill agent with opportunity v1 is given by ηe ev1 where e e = argmax{ηev1 − ψ(e)},














































Proof of Proposition 3. If the ﬁrst best cannot be implemented the eﬀort of the high skill agent,
es















































which concludes the proof. 












that is, such that the signaling equilibrium supports the referral of v1 whereas the ﬁrst best policy
does not. Because condition (2) is violated the ﬁrst best level of welfare is
W

















41whereas that of the signaling equilibrium is








+ (1 − π)ur
l(v1).
But W








, a contradiction. 
Partnership contracts
Let W [y1,y0] be the welfare function deﬁned in the space of output allocations resulting from
task v1 and v0 respectively.
Lemma A2. W [·,·] is quasiconcave.
Proof: Recall that the welfare function is:
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. Recall that ψ(·)





















and similarly with ˆ y1. Hence:









































This concludes the proof. 
























 < 0 for all y0 < y
fb
























and bend “backwards” whenever
y1 > y
fb




Sc = {[y1,y0] such that Φh(y1) ≥ Φl(y0)},
that is, the set of incentive compatible allocations, and deﬁne Fc as the frontier of Sc, which deﬁnes
y0 as a function of y1.















































































































as recall that ψ000(·) ≥ 0,38 Φ0(·) > 0 and Φ00(·) > 0.
Finally because Φh(y) is a strictly concave function of output it has a unique maximum at
y∗












does not belong to Sc.
By Lemma A3 the frontier is a strictly concave function (the set of incentive compatible allocations
Sc is convex.) Furthermore Sc is a compact set. Maximization of the strictly quasiconcave welfare
38This is the only step where this assumption is used.
43function on the feasible set yields a unique maximum. Clearly, the planner places the allocation
in the downward sloping side of the frontier (see ﬁgure III). The slope of the frontier of incentive









Fc < 0. But
































Proof of Proposition 6. Clearly if the organization can implement the ﬁrst best or if it cannot




0 are independent of π.
If, on the other hand, the organization can only support communication with distortions then
(36) is binding. The derivative of y
p
0 with respect to y
p
1, as given by equation (48), is negative
in the eﬃcient side of the frontier of incentive compatible contracts (see ﬁgure IV). Taking the
derivative of Wp, as given by equation (29), with respect to y
p
1, to obtain the ﬁrst order condition




dπ yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 7. Trivially if the signaling equilibrium cannot support any referrals, then
the utilitarian planner can always support a non referral rule by setting the transfers to the low




































v1] such that the signaling allocation can be supported as a







































v1] is the share of output that accrues to the low skill agent in the event of of the



























































As for (32), start by recalling that equation (14) is met with equality by market clearing (see























































where the inequality follows from (13). 
Proof of Proposition 9. The contract consists of the high skill agent referring a low value
opportunity v0 for a ﬁxed price q. Incentive compatibility requires that:
max
e {ev1 − ψ(e)} ≥ uh + q ≥ max
e {ev0 − ψ(e)} (51)
max
e
{ηev0 − ψ(e)} − q ≥ ul. (52)
Since there are more low skill agents competing for low value opportunities, they are kept at their
reservation values, so that from (52), q = maxe {ηev0 − ψ(e)} − ul, and condition (52) is trivially
met.
45As for (51) ﬁrst notice that,
uh + q = uh + max
e
{ηev0 − ψ(e)} − ul > max
e
{ev0 − ψ(e)},
where the last inequality follows from (1). Next notice that,
uh + q = uh + max
e {ηev0 − ψ(e)} − ul
< uh + max




where, once again, the last inequality follows from (2). Hence condition (51) is met. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Let the ﬁxed price of transacted claims be q. We show that any price
q such that




{θA(vA)evA − ψ(e)} − uA,max
e
{θB(vB)evB − ψ(e)} − uB
i
(53)
supports the ﬁrst best horizontal referral ﬂow. Without loss of generality assume that an agent of
specialty A draws a problem of specialty B. Clearly he prefers to refer it as he obtains uA+q. As for
the receiving agent, that of specialty B, he accepts the referral as (53) guarantees that the price q
of the claim is low enough to compensate him for the opportunity cost uB. Assume next that agent
A draws a claim on his own specialty. If he falsely refers it as claim B he stands to obtain uA + q
whereas if he keeps it he earns maxe {θA(vA)evA − ψ(e)}. But by (53), maxe {θA(vA)evA − ψ(e)} ≥
uA + q. Price q then supports the referral of claims B and the non-referral of claim A, as the ﬁrst
best prescribed. The proof is symmetric for the agent of specialty B. 
Signaling through linear sharing rules
The reader may be skeptical about the informational requirements of a solution like the one
suggested before, since the contracts prescribe diﬀerent sharing rules depending on whether the
output is the equilibrium output or out of equilibrium. Cognitive limitations by part of agents may
also bias the contracts towards simpler forms.
Here we brieﬂy show that a separating signaling equilibrium can also be obtained in the spot
market when we restrict the contracting space to two part tariﬀs. That is, the contract awards
the low skill agent sl[y] = p + s · y(v1|v1), where p is the ﬁxed price and s is the portion of output
obtained by the low skill agent when she refers the task, which is independent of the actual output
produced.

















46As for the high skill agent he chooses his eﬀort level to maximize his utility. Recall that now
the share of output that corresponds to the high skill agent is sh[y(v1|v1)] = (1 − s) · y(v1|v1) − p.
Then the output produced by the high skill agent will be the solution to:






and the participation constraint of the high skill agent is now












The problem of the low skill agent is now to maximize (11) subject to (54), (55), and the
participation constraint (56).
Note that, unlike before, the linear sharing contract always distorts the output decision of the
high skill agent with respect to the ﬁrst best.
The following lemma, whose proof is along similar lines as proposition 2, shows that there exists
a linear sharing contract that can support separation.
Lemma A4. There exists a two part tariﬀ (p∗, s∗) with s∗ ∈ (0,1) which supports a separating
signaling equilibrium. This solution imposes larger distortions than the optimal spot market
signaling contract and has less referrals.
Thus simpler, two part tariﬀ, contracts can achieve the exact same aim of ensuring that the op-
portunities referred are the more valuable ones, but the linear restriction imposes larger distortions














Region a denotes the set of economies for which the spot market implements the ﬁrst
best. Region b denotes the set of economies for which the spot contract supports commu-
nications with distortions. Region c is the set of economies for which the spot market
cannot support any communication. Recall that the ﬁrst best prescribes the referral of












Region d denotes the set of economies for which organizations do not arise. Region
e denotes the set of economies where the organization supports communications but
with distortions. Region f denotes the set of economies for which the organization
implements the ﬁrst best. The dotted line denotes the frontier for the spot market case.
49